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      Perhaps no other society has been so consistently studied in comparative 
terms as has modern Japan. The reasons for that lie both in Japan's modern his-
tory and in the development of the social sciences (in Japan itself as well as in 
Europe and North America). A century ago, the most insular of the world's 
complexly organized and relatively prosperous societies deliberately set about, 
systematically and selectively, to adapt the institutional, economic, and social 
practices of Western nations to its own society. That extraordinary choice, which 
set Japan on its modern course, inserted a comparative consciousness into 
Japanese decision making and into the very institutions that have marked the new 
era. Western interest in Japan has also always had a strong comparative element. 
The sharp increase in Western contacts with Japan came at a time when Western 
imperialists, merchants, and scholars thought they knew a good deal about China 
and India; and they tended to comprehend Japan, no matter what their particular 
mixture of observation and stereotypes, by comparing it with better-known 
Asian nations. Following World War II, American occupiers, confident of the 
social and political model they represented, used comparison in assessing what 
could and should change in Japanese society; and Western social scientists, fascin-
ated with the processes of modernization and development, have provided an ex-
tensive framework for systematic comparisons. The resulting scholarship has 
been so impressive, and the habit of thinking of Japan in comparative terms has 
become so ingrained, that it becomes reasonable to ask whether further emphasis 
on comparison is needed and what direction new comparative analyses might 
take. 
     This is not the place, and I am certainly not the person, to undertake a 
review of the extraordinarily rich literature on Japanese society that asks fun-
damentally comparative questions. Given the extent and quality of this literature, 
it is obvious that studies of Japan will continue to use comparative frameworks 
and are likely to compare Japan with a wider range of societies, Asian as well as 
American and European. In that way study of Japan may lead to new sets of 
comparative questions and thus have greater importance for the construction of 
general theories and for social research overall than it has had in the past. 
     Before speculating about the directions this new literature may take, we 
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should note the liberation from older preoccupations that has already taken place. 
Earlier interest in the role of tradition in Japanese society tended to see its im-
portance as paradoxical in a society that had adroitly adjusted to the organization-
al and commercial requirements of the contemporary world. The questions that 
followed and the answers given to them tended, even when they proved fruitful, 
to have an awkward, external and somewhat contrived quality. The assumption 
that tradition is the antithesis of modernity is now passe. The multiple combina-
tions within Japanese society of old customs, values, and rites with new forms of 
social organization created to meet changing needs no longer surprises or requires 
special explanation. 
     On the other hand, the ways in which specific traditions intersect with and 
even facilitate new behaviors and attitudes is not only a matter of considerable 
interest in itself (and a stimulus to anthropological, sociological, cultural, and his-
torical study) but an invitation to comparative analysis. For this employment of 
tradition for modern purposes in Japan invites comparison with other societies. 
Can we observe when traditions have the kind of ideological neutrality that 
makes them readily applicable to new behaviors and when they serve to discour-
age or inhibit certain kinds of change? The study of Japan may suggest useful 
answers to those questions because the employment of customary attitudes and 
behavior to enable change has, perhaps, been more consistent, systematic, and 
self-conscious in Japan than anywhere else. 
     Recognition that tradition and modernity should not be thought of as 
dichotomous has been facilitated by abandonment of so-called modernization 
theory. It was, of course, never a single theory; and many of the criticisms 
against it have been unfair (as evidenced by the fact that, although the "theory" is 
almost universally denounced, a great many of the concepts associated with it 
continue to be used by its critics). The charge against theories of modernization 
most relevant here is that they incorporate teleological assumptions using an 
abstract standard of modernity based on how modernization in the prosperous 
and democratic nations of Europe and North America ought to work. That lim-
ited imaginative comparison because it invited the comparison of Japanese reality 
with a general standard not subject to comparably close analysis of specific en-
vironments and particular needs. Furthermore, if it stimulated seeing Japan in 
comparative terms, it favored comparison in a single direction, using an invented 
standard as the basis for questions about Japanese society but not using Japanese 
experience to ask fresh questions about societies elsewhere (although the axioms 
of modernization were sometimes challenged). In the case of Japanese studies, 
the movement away from theories of modernization has followed rather naturally 
from the repeated evidence that in Japan behaviors and values reasonably called
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traditional and dramatically effective forms of modernity cohabit very easily. 
Even academics cannot sustain surprise when the same discovery is made over 
and over. 
     In sum, modernization is simply not the interesting question it once was, 
in part because Japan has so indisputable accomplished it (whatever moderniza-
tion is taken to be) and done so distinctively but also because developments in 
South Korea, Spain, and Eastern Europe demonstrate that there are clearly many 
paths to modern social, economic, and political changes and many societies pre-
pared to follow them. Nor is modernization, as once envisioned, any longer 
seen as an unalloyed good, and that is a significant gain for the future of com-
parison. There will be fewer references to "successful" modernization in the fu-
ture and thus more room for comparison instead in terms of specific goals 
(whether those consciously chosen by elites or those historians declare to have 
been implicit) and of, often unintended, consequences. That makes comparison 
of Japan with other societies all the more valuable. 
     The earlier emphasis on the miracle of Japanese modernization (independ-
ent of modernization theory) is also fading, and "success" (not a good category 
for analytic comparison) should disappear with it. Future scholarship will cer-
tainly continue to compare particular institutions and practices (in schools or the 
workplace, for example) but is less likely than earlier work to treat that single 
topic as a mirror for, and basis for comment on, all of Japanese society and cul-
ture. Similarly, one can expect fewer comparisons between Japan and an undiffe-
rentiated "West. " 
     Within essentially Western studies, attention to Japan modifies generaliza-
tions based primarily on European experience. For students of state making 
from the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries, Japanese history challenges the 
heavy emphasis in the European literature on military need as the impetus for the 
growth of the state. Similarly, Japan's parallel development while relatively iso-
lated is troublesome for many of the claims in theories of capitalist expansion 
through the creation of a world system of trade, division of labor, and depend-
ence. 
      In themselves all these developments strike me as positive, and they cer-
tainly suggest that the well-established practice of looking at Japanese history 
comparatively will continue, in a sense, on its own momentum, reminding us to 
expect change from whatever source to be integrated with established culture, to 
look not for measures of success but for the delineation of process, and to move 
beyond preoccupation with Japan's difference and consider what comparison of 
Japan with other societies can contribute to our general understanding.
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                      II 
     That does not indicate the new directions likely to be taken. Those will 
undoubtedly follow from the general preoccupations of current scholarship, and 
that in itself is significant. It means that the questions central to future compara-
tive scholarship, less involved with explanations of Japan's uniqueness, will use 
evidence from Japan as a basis for comparison with other in order to refine the 
generalizations and theories current in writings about society. Applying external 
categories to new cases can, of course, be a fairly mechanical and dull exercize, 
but it can also lead to some welcome surprises. 
     There are, then, some reasons for being optimistic about the benefits to 
social theory from comparative study of Japan. Take, for example, the use of 
Foucaldian concepts, like discourse. As most commonly used, they invite atten-
tion to the ways in which understanding is shaped and power exercized through 
the use of supposedly neutral, rational or practical practices and methods of in-
quiry. Japan, however, offers unusually rich and clear examples of instances in 
which formal discourse appears to have changed radically but with less alteration 
in the locus of power or patterns of behavior than might be expected. Studies of 
various forms of social control in Japan (such as law, education, socialization 
through the family, and police), which have already proven especially stimulat-
ing, provide an opportunity not only for analyzing change but for assessing when 
different forms of discourse and when various levels of social control have come 
into play, how discourse and practice have been related, and what effect that re-
lationship has had. We should expect close investigation of Japanese experience 
to challenge, amend, or refine important analytic concepts hitherto largely based 
on French, English, and American history. 
     In a similar way, the study of Japan may have something important to 
contribute to the literature on colonial encounters. Anthropologists and histo-
rians, through highly creative research using concepts of hegemony, insights into 
orientalism, and the results of subaltern studies have made this one of the most 
exciting and flourishing areas of scholarship. By its very nature, this work is 
often more original and penetrating with regard to European interests, ideologies, 
and misconceptions than it is with respect to the responses of non-European 
societies. Comparison with Japan offers a chance to look with a fresh eye at the 
reception of European culture and institutions because Japan selectively adopted 
Western practices, responding to the pressures carried in encounters with the 
West without experiencing direct imperial rule. That should make it possible 
therefore to distinguish more clearly the challenge simply inherent in the internal 
dynamics of European institutions, capitalism, and culture from the corrosive 
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effects of the sustained application of European power. 
     Much the same may also be true for flourishing fields of inquiry like gen-
der studies. If findings based on Western experience are applicable to Japan, then 
Judeo-Christian attitudes toward sex, gender, and family may be less central to 
Western practice than commonly assumed. The ways in which Japanese practices 
have and have not been affected by the great economic and structural changes 
Japan has experienced can also provide relatively clear indicators of the effects of 
structural changes and in that way contribute to theories of gender relations. 
Changes in Japan and contemporary writing about them refer often to gener-
ational differences, which may well be especially important and visible in modern 
Japan. If that is true, this is another universally significant topic about the nature 
of social change to which comparative study of Japan may have much to add.
                      III 
     Comparisons of specific Japanese institutions with those of other nations 
have been among the great strengths of the literature. Here, too, the trends are 
promising. There is, for example, a greater tendency to take Japanese institutions 
as they are rather than to analyze them in terms of how they do or do not meet 
the criteria of similar institutions elsewhere. The difficulty comes with the rec-
ognition that apparently comparable institutions may in fact serve quite different 
societal functions in different eras and different countries. Merely comparing in-
stitutions that carry the same name can become a form of mistranslation, mistak-
ing their differences for lacunae or the added functions of a Japanese institution as 
incomplete differentiation or substitutions for something other institutions. Be-
cause the literature on such seemingly universal social institutions as labor unions, 
banks, police, or associations is extensive, sophisticated, and largely based on 
European and American experience and because the Japanese versions of such in-
stitutions are often relatively recent and in fact were often deliberately based on 
western models, an unintended cultural bias can easily become part of the analy-
sis from the start. The danger is not so much that differences are seen as flaws, 
most serious scholars are well-armed against such assumptions, it is rather that 
differences from western models are, first, treated as the surprise to be explained 
and then, second, all too readily given a broad cultural explanation. 
      The tension between structural and cultural analysis, which most of us 
would regret in the abstract as misleading and unrealistic, nevertheless often com-
es into play because an institutional analysis tends to emphasize specific social 
functions and their relationship to the larger social structure. When this analysis 
does not account for actual behavior, the unexpected gaps or accretions are readily 
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attributable to cultural factors. That may indeed be correct, but it requires its 
own careful demonstration. The temptation is to have recourse to well-estab-
lished cultural explanations, and that is dangerous precisely because those ex-
planations are comfortably familiar and likely to pass unchallenged and because, 
unless newly derived from the evidence at hand, they add little. It is too easy, in 
short, to treat Japanese institutions like similar institutions elsewhere in order to 
discover that their peculiarities are like things Japanese, leaving us to discover 
only what we already knew about the institution and about Japan. Similarity be-
comes institutional; function, structural; and difference, cultural. 
     It is tempting to imagine the gains that might come from comparing not 
institutions but social functions themselves. The difficulty is that, except where 
there is a very firm theoretical base and/or a very narrow set of functions, a 
check list is not easily established. The practical solution tends to be to compare 
institutions in terms of specific attributes, to compare political parties, for exam-
ple, not in terms of some (western) model of what parties are but in terms of 
their constituencies, ideolgies, use of patronage, organization, ways of selecting 
leaders, and so forth. That leads, of course, to an assessment of what the parties 
in question really do, how they connect to political power, and what the bound-
aries of the political arena are at a given time. This latter, the question of what 
issues and interests are and are not normally part of public political negotiation, is 
particularly interesting - and difficult. 
     A broad institutional focus has produced especially impressive work deal-
ing with such matters as the role of law, education, and the family. Perhaps that 
could be taken further. One could imagine, for example, a comparative study of 
what one might call the "sources of cohesion" in different societies at specific 
times. Taking Japan as the starting point, much of European history could be 
seen as a series of attempts to achieve - through theories of divine right, reli-
gious uniformity, parliamentary representation, ethnic and cultural homogeneity, 
or mass participation - a quality of cohesiveness and legitimacy that Japan main-
tained less explicitly and with far less contestation.
                      IV 
      Current issues are always a major stimulus to new research, lending a wel-
come air of relevance and, more important, generating fresh questions to be ex-
plored. That may be especially true for comparative study, for new perspectives 
help encourage explorations beyond traditional boundaries set by the scholarly 
literature, each academic discipline, and the focus on national states. Because 
Japan is so important to the modern world, comparison of its social practices 
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with those of other societies can be expected to become ever more frequent. 
Japan's prominence in world markets is one obvious stimulus to such compari-
sons (as is competition itself}, and for over a generation specialists have studied 
the quality and efficiency of industrial production in Japan by placing their stu-
dies in a variety of comparative frameworks. 
     Japan's increasing participation in international economic planning and 
foreign aid creates new opportunities for comparison. After all, the Japanese eco-
nomy flourished with national policies quite different from those advocated by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Whether or not the poli-
cies Japanese governments favor in the future, for themselves and others, will re-
flect this experience, the opportunities for comparative analysis of trade policies 
can only increase. Since World War II, international aid for development has 
come primarily from the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and Great Bri-
tain. Some interesting comparisons of the policies of donor countries and of the 
efficacy of their operations on the scene have been undertaken, and there is cer-
tainly room for further research, especially in terms of differences in cultural in-
teraction. More comparison has been made between the programs of govern-
ments and of non-governmental agencies. Now, as the Japanese participate more 
actively in these sorts of programs, the policies they favor and, more interesting-
ly, their relations with local populations should invite some stimulating compara-
tive analysis. Specific issues of policy, in short, should encourage and even 
necessitate, new comparisons leading to increased understanding of all the 
affected societies. 
      The reasons for greater attention to Japan in the discussion of contempor-
ary issues go well beyond international economic and political connections, 
however. Western observers have long been drawn to study Japanese society's 
distinctive responses to universal social needs, and that tendency is now rein-
forced both by the nature of the salient social issues and by the theoretical base 
on which much of the related research rests. Two quick examples will suffice. 
Building on the writings of the Frankfort school, Michel Foucault and his legion 
of followers, and Gramscian conceptions of hegemony, scholars have produced 
notably thoughtful work on such pressing social issues such as the marginaliza-
tion of minorities and crime. These are problems affecting all modern societies, 
and a strikingly high proportion of the research on them is significantly compara-
tive. The commonality of modern social problems will mean an increasing in-
corporation of Japanese instances into their study. 
      That is equally true for quite different sorts of modern issues. Take, for 
example, the growing scholarly literature on the uses of the past, on the selective 
and contrived nature of public memory, and on the effects of repressing or 
                              179
Raymond GREW 
denying the recent past. The twentieth century has given every society much to 
want to forget, and nationalism everywhere has always made powerful use of 
mythic and selective histories. Within the last decade, there has been an extraor-
dinary amount of writing on this topic, much of it unsurprising in its revelations 
of distorted memory but some of it unusually imaginative. Little of it has been 
comparative. Surely careful study of the differences in what is remembered and 
what surpressed in different eras and nations should prove revealing. Might it 
not also be possible to compare the very processes of creating selective collective 
memory in different societies? If so, the inclusion of Japan should further under-
standing of ritual, religion, literature, institutions, and politics in establishing 
memory. The importance of cultural conceptions of time, of the nature of his-
tory, and of the direction of historical change, have long been major themes in 
some of the most admired philosophical, historical, and anthropological writing. 
Studying these concepts across societies through focused and empirical compari-
son might avoid the dangers of Orientalism while recapturing something of its 
power.
V 
      There is no compelling distinction between research on contemporary so-
cial problems and on historical problems except for the origin of the curiosity 
and the probable conceptual framework within which the research is conducted. 
The distinction provides a way, however, to make the case that some of the 
problems that currently engage historians are ones for which Japanese history 
may have particular value. Western attention to issues of gender, race, and 
identity benefits from a theoretical literature that can only gain from being tested 
against the Japanese case. The passionate engagement, which is one of the 
strengths of this literature, also reflects distinctly European and, especially, 
American issues and ideologies. This scholarship is, in effect, wrestling on every 
page with Enlightenment and Judeo-Christian values (and with conflicting inter-
pretations of them). Now, if it is true that modern Japanese civilization rests on 
and still reflects a very different, non-Axial metaphysics, then comparison should 
provide the opportunity for an important refinement of theory and of such com-
mon categories as gender, race, and class. 
     The vector of comparison has continued to flow primarily from western 
experience to Japan, and the implication of these comments is that it might be 
very fruitful to reverse that vector, to start from a Japanese perspective. Consider 
the current interest in the construction of ethnic and national identities. If an 
emphasis on "exclusivity and particularity" has been an important part of 
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Japanese culture and has served important social purposes, then much may be 
learned from considering what other societies have suffered or gained from the 
absence of such an effective consensus. In this light it might be possible to 
discern more clearly the internal dynamics of France's mission civilisatrice, 
Slavophile concern for the Russian soul; the British sense of liberal, Victorian and 
imperial order; China's emphasis on ancient and autonomous grandeur, and 
American exceptionalism and manifest destiny. 
     Or take the study of European imperialism, one of the liveliest topics in 
contemporary anthropology, history, and historical sociology. Studies of the op-
eration of imperialism in India, Indonesia, and Africa have not only transformed 
the understanding of that topic but made fundamental contributions to the 
analysis of cultural hegemony and class dominance within European societies 
themselves. This work has stressed the distruptive and disintegrative effects of 
European intrusions (economic and political and independent of intentions). It 
has been sensitive to the tragedy of local subalterns, and probed how European 
misconceptions and prejudices fit with the exercise of power but were also deeply 
rooted in European culture, formal learning, general culture, and social structure. 
Much of the writing on imperialism, in short, has had as much and maybe even 
more to say about Europe and America than about the societies subject to Euro-
pean rule. Japan offers an invaluable contrasting case, in which before World 
War II, at least, ideas and institutions and practices from the west were not im-
posed by force but selectively adopted. As writing on imperialism comes to 
emphasize the study of local response and the capacity of local societies to choose 
what to adopt and how to adapt to the onslaught of the influences carried by 
imperialism, comparison with Japan should be essential. 
      Because Japan is by every standard a very modern society yet one that 
developed from a cultural base very different from that of most other modern 
societies, comparison with Japan can lead to some essential discrimination in the 
analysis of many phenomena associated with modernity. The horrors of the 
twentieth century, secularization, and commercial culture are three such topics 
that can serve to illustrate the point and suggest the wide range of subjects in 
which research can benefit from incorporating comparison with Japan. 
      Genocide, mass murder, and systematic brutality hang over every inter-
pretation of modernity. Study of fundamentalisms and of the ease with which 
former communists have switched to being nationalists ready to practice ethnic 
cleansing strengthens the recognition that there is something inherently modern 
about all this. But there remains some question, I think, about what those mod-
ern elements are beyond the awful opportunities that technology provides. Many 
believe the brutality apparently characteristic of modernity to be rooted in the 
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Enlightenment and the development of utopian ideologies that led to institu-
tionalized efforts to remake society. But Japan in the 1930s and `40s invites a 
search for alternative explanations. Neither Enlightenment nor Judeo-Christian 
forms of intolerance and hubris were fundaments of Japanese thinking; yet there, 
too, the embrace of military values and the high social costs of mobilizing the 
public for extraordinary sacrifices in the name of common aims opened the way 
to systematic oppression at home and brutality abroad. Perhaps that is the pro-
cess that leads to claiming that the community is the only important social actor 
and makes belonging to the group the essential social test - one which requires a 
steady escalation in the measures of loyalty from acquiescence to ever-sharper 
boundaries between us and the Other, and to sacrifice. Ultimately that need to 
prove total loyalty may make brutality functional. Dehumanizing those outside 
the group, daring to do the extraordinary and normally unacceptable, and, 
finally, sharing the resultant guilt may strengthen communal bonds. The history 
of Japan invites us to test such alternative explanations. 
      The secularization of modern society has been a central theme of social 
analysis for two centuries, a subject that has attracted many of the most influen-
tial modern thinkers. There is, however, more agreement that secularization has 
occurred and is fundamentally important than there is about what secularization 
means. For many social scientists and most committed Christians and conserva-
tives, securalization encompasses a decline in religious faith, the spread of 
rationalism and a preference for scientific explanations, and the social and institu-
tional weakening of organized religion. For others, secularization describes the 
establishment of public spheres from which formal religion is largely excluded 
but does not necessarily indicate a decline in belief (and may even permit more 
demanding standards of religious belief and behavior). In the European and 
American context the understanding of secularization involves interpretations of 
formal theology, deism, the liberal ideal of the neutral state, toleration, the public 
sphere, and political divisions since the French Revolution. 
     With all that cultural baggage, comparison with Japan may be especially 
instructive. Has a kind of secularization taken place in Japan in the last fifty years 
or more? Many important spheres of Japanese public and private life appear to 
have been increasingly separated from religious rituals and metaphysical concerns. 
At the same time, in Japan such secularization is usually not taken to be an attack 
on religion. As the existing scholarship clearly suggests, further comparison with 
Japan may help more generally to clarify analysis of the social and organizational 
bases of secularization, of the importance of custom and ritual as religious 
expressions, and of the ways in which secularization relates to religious beliefs. 
     Another important element of modern life that is also a significant 
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historical problem is the development, spread, and meaning of a commercial 
popular culture. The habit is to see all this in American terms, as the spread 
from American society through American enterprise of films, music, comic 
strips, clothing, and fast foods that become popular with masses around the 
world. Now the point is not just that Japan has energetically contributed to that 
popular culture and will continue to do so. Rather, the inclusion of Japan in 
comparative study can deepen understanding of how cultural filters work, of 
how the malleability of symbols and the advantages to embrace a genre without 
the associations it carries in its native land may in fact allow the receiving society 
to adopt (and reinterpret) imported popular cultures while leaving its own cultu-
ral base essentially in tact. Some of these filters are built into commercial forms 
of culture from the start, making foreign restaurants exotic but safe, rock music 
and the latest styles evocative of youth and liberation yet largely divorced from 
specific value systems. In addition, each culture has its own filters, allowing the 
selective incorporation and rejection of the component elements of calculatedly 
commercial entertainments. The Japanese example is an excellent opportunity to 
explore these issues and to rethink the meaning of the spread around the world of 
popular, commercial culture. 
     Perhaps the clearest example of a major contemporary issue that has also 
become a field of historical research and for which Japanese history has great im-
portance is globalization. Because Japan is the most famous case of conscious 
borrowing, it makes that process more visible than in societies that may have 
borrowed as much from their neighbors but did so over a longer period of time 
and less deliberately. This consciousness makes the Japanese examples singularly 
important, revealing how adapting the practices and institutions of others may be 
a way to encourage yet contain change. The rich literature on Meiji policies has 
a great deal to teach all of us who work on other parts of the world, but there is 
room for more. Much of that literature was written from an institutional pers-
pective that did not have the benefit of current sociology and anthropology, and 
much of it was conceived when the central preoccupation was to identify what 
was unique (and often, from the perspective of the 1950s and 60s, therefore not 
entirely adequate) in Japanese development. 
     Global history has, I think, something to add to Japanese historiography; 
but, more important, Japanese history has a great deal to offer for the under-
standing of global historical processes. Japanese attention to the nation's interna-
tional standing from the late nineteenth century to the present can be taken to be 
a sign of globalization in itself, and it contains a still more significant element. 
Professor Eisenstadt points out that Japan's precocious encounter with external 
trends, influences, and pressures was not understood in moral or ideological 
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terms and therefore did not require some conversion to alien ways which were 
recognized as a reality to be addressed. That is very close to the worldwide ex-
perience of the increased, global circulation of ideas, technologies, and com-
merce. 
     Japan can be seen, then, as a pioneer in the adaptation to global connec-
tions, and Japanese history clarifies the process of cultural borrowing by revealing 
the sort of groups that instigate that process, how a given foreign model is 
chosen, how it is altered and adapted in practice, and how unintended results are 
understood and dealt with. Historians of globalization, as well as policy makers 
in every country, would do well to study Japan's responses in the nineteenth cen-
tury and now to the subversive power of international markets that constrict the 
state's capacity to shape social conditions and terms of work and challenge the 
culture's capacity to select among external influences.
                   V1 
     Although comparison centered on specific historical problems is preferable 
to comparisons that attempt to encompass whole societies, I would like to illus-
trate (in dangerously general terms) the interesting questions that Japanese history 
can generate about other societies by suggestion a comparison of modern Japan 
and modern Italy - a society famous for efficiency, order, and constraint with 
one notorious for disorderly spontaneity, one a model of extraordinary unity and 
consensus, the other associated with division and contestation. 
     The two histories share some striking similarities. Both nations have 
essentially natural geographical boundaries. Both are long and narrow (impor-
tant for communication) islands or peninsulas largely surrounded by water. Both 
were late modernizers, industrializing and adopting the forms of the modern state 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, after the models had been well 
established elsewhere. Indeed the Meiji Restoration and the Risorgimento have 
much in common as political and social transformations that for the most part 
kept established elites in place, that maintained an older monarchy with ill-
defined roles, adopted representative institutions but with limited suffrage and 
limited power, and relied on a centralized state. Not surprisingly, scholars and 
social critics continually rediscover that, by a widespread if somewhat mythical 
standard, neither nation experienced the benefits of a "real" revolution. 
      Parallels continue in their subsequent histories. Social convention was 
important in both societies, which remained in many ways quite conservative. 
Paradoxically, however, neither developed a strong ideological, political conser-
vatism (although in Italy the Catholic church sometimes provided an effective 
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substitute). Intensely concerned to establish their nation's place among the great 
powers, the leaders of both countries were drawn toward Germany and to 
dramatic military action against older, weakening empires in the Russo Japanese 
war of 1905 and Italy's war against Turkey in 1911-12. Both ended up on the 
winning side in World War I and were dissatisfied afterward with what they got 
for their efforts. Both then turned to forms of fascism in an effort to accelerate 
change and increase social mobilization while maintained social order (and Italian 
Fascism can be seen in part as an effort to achieve in Italy the sort of consensus 
Japan had accomplished). Defeated during World War II, both were subject to 
heavy American political, economic, and social influences. 
      There are parallels as well in their economic histories. Both societies were 
unusually urban prior to industrialization, but both are relatively poor in raw 
materials. Once industrialization was underway, the government in both nations 
had close ties to new industries, particularly shipbuilding and steel; and in both, 
those ties grew closer in the 1930s and through World War II so that the direct 
economic role of the state has been unusually important (since 1940, the 
Italian state has owned a higher proportion of the national economy than any 
non-communist government). In both countries a majority of the working 
population was employed in agriculture in 1950 and in both that proportion was 
below ten per cent by 1980. And in the fifty years since 1945, Japan and Italy 
have had the steadiest rate of high economic growth of any industrial countries. 
Thus the two societies have undergone fundamental and in many ways parallel 
social changes. Both now embrace new technology enthusiastically; both excel 
in industrial design and marketing. 
     Not surprisingly descriptions of the most recent changes in Japan and Italy 
also sound similar. The long dominance of a single political party came apart, in 
1993 in Japan, 1994 in Italy. Both are experiencing the deregulation and priva-
tization fashionable around the world with the added shock that comes from the 
greater contrast between these policies and past practices. In both there is much 
talk about generational change and curiosity about whether old social networks 
can hold together. 
      That Japan and Italy have so much in common makes their differences 
interesting. Japan sustained the illusion, at least, of essentially autonomous 
development; Italy has always acknowedged close ties to the rest of Europe. The 
military played a major role in Japanese modernization but did not in Italy, 
despite the prominance of the military in Piedmont (Italy's founding state) and 
the continuing tie between the monarchy and the armed forces. It is difficult to 
find any parallel in Japanese history to the conflicts between Church and State 
that have been a central element of Italian history for centuries. Are differences 
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like these possibly related to the most obvious ones, to the greater efficiency of 
Japanese administration or relative ineffectiveness of law enforcement in Italy? 
      Comparison between Japan and Italy, then, opens a series of questions any 
one of which might be the basis for substantial comparative research. In particu-
lar they seem likely to open fresh prespectives on Italian society. Given the con-
trast between Japan's tradition of considering economic growih in the service of 
the nation and the country's high degree of political and economic coordination, 
how has Italy compensated for its apparent lack in these areas? It would be 
worthwhile comparing how social (and political and institutional) networks func-
tion in the two countries, comparing the use of kinship ties in business and poli-
tics, the reciprocal relations of formal and informal groups, and so forth. 
Japanese economic growth owes a lot to skillful long-range planning and a high 
degree of decentralization within large corporations given security by protective 
ties to banks and government. In analyzing Italy's economic growth, economists 
emphasize the flexibility of many medium-sized and often family-controlled en-
terprises engaged in the same of sector of production and clustered in the same 
region where these firms both cooperate and intensely compete. Are these differ-
ences fundamental, the contrasting practices of distinctive cultures, responses to 
different markets, or merely alternative means of achieving similar ends? 
      Comparison of social networks might also explore the sources, the style, 
and the functions of what outsiders, at least, label corruption, which is believed 
to be considerable in both countries. Do private arrangements and hidden econo-
mic exchanges occur differently in networks based on kinship, from those based 
on institutional connection, region, shared values, or short-term interest? Do 
these different kinds of networks have different effects in the operations of gov-
ernment, political parties, education, and commerce? What does comparison of 
Japan and Italy suggest about the relative importance of these different sorts of 
networks. 
      These topics are closely related, of course, to questions of elite formation; 
and here the different course the two societies have taken is especially provoca-
tive. In the 1880s both relied on a highly selective, quite competitive, and presti-
gious system of elite education, closely tied to a much-admired national culture. 
Japan then speedily developed an effective system of universal education, while 
Italy moved slowly; higher education in Japan became ever more universalistic, 
competitive, and constraining while in Italy it remained looser, more connected 
to status than competitive ability, and a less essential filter for individual advance-
ment. Would it be possible to demonstrate what consequences such fundamental 
differences have had? 
      The argument for such comparisons is that they can be reasonably con-
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tained in specific cases and periods, methodologically controlled comparisons that 
use empirical evidence. Nevertheless, the idea of comparing aspects of two 
societies inevitably opens the temptation to compare them as a whole. In the 
light of Professor Eisenstadt's striking study of Japan, it is hard not to think 
about the fact that Italian civilization is about as Axial as civilization can get: ever 
conscious of its classical roots, for two millenia the center of the most universal 
of churches, an enthusiastic participant in the universalism of the Enlightenment 
and the French Revolution, the home of a nationalist ideology that claimed its 
principles were equally applicable to all peoples, drawn to the universalistic 
claims of liberalism and then of Marxism, and currently the most enthusiastic 
supporter of the European Union in terms of its stated principles as well as its 
immediate benefits. The contrast with Japan could hardly be greater. Could we 
show in any particular sphere of activity at a particular time how this difference 
has mattered? 
      One always hopes that comparison will challenge received opinion and 
lead to some refinement of academic commonplaces. Individual studies often 
allege that Japan and Italy have weak public spheres, that something is missing 
from their civic cultures. Yet comparison reveals the characteristics of the two 
societies in this regard are very different and that by any definition they have 
equally different weaknesses (and strengths). Perhaps a deeper comparison of 
Japan and Italy would compel some rethinking of these terms (once we deter-
mined what the evidence should look like). Rethinking of that sort would be 
justification enough for further comparative study.
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